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ARGUMENT 
Issue 1: The Appellee is Incorrect in His Reasoning and Analysis in Regards to 
Whether the District Court Abused its Discretion in Determining that Mrs. Boyer 
Was Not Awarded an Equitable Interest with Mr. Boyer in the Commercial 
Building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, Where Mr. Boyer Conducts His Business. 
In her brief, Mrs. Boyer quoted particular language from relevant cases regarding 
equitable property division. On page 18 of her brief, Mrs. Boyer stated the following: 
"Any significant disparity in the division of the remaining property should be 
based on an equitable rationale other than on the sole fact that one spouse is 
awarded his or her gifts of inheritance." Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476,483 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2008), quoting Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. The Stonehocker Court 
was addressing the issue of the trial court providing an equitable division of 
marital property, which in most instances does not include gifts or 
inheritances. Id. In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "[mjarital 
property is ordinarily all property acquired during the marriage and it 
'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, 
whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.'" Dunn v. Dunn, 802 
P.2d 1314, 1317-1318 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted). 
(Appellant's brief, page 18) 
In the Appellee's brief, he cites to a four (4) step process of what a Trial Court must 
do when considering the division of property: 
1. Determine what is martial and separate property; 2. "Consider whether there 
are exceptional circumstances that overcome the general presumption that 
marital property be divided equally between the parties." Id. At ^ [15; 3. Assign 
values to each item of marital property; 4. "Distribute the items of marital 
property in a manner consistent with that distribution strategy, with a view 
toward allowing each party to go forward with his or her separate life." Id. 
(Appellee's brief, pages 12, 13) 
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It is clear that the commercial building located on 25 Street, in Ogden, Utah, was 
marital property between Mr. Boyer and Mrs. Boyer. The problem that Mr. Boyer faces in 
his Brief, is that in regards to his analysis in the division of his interest in the commercial 
building on 25th Street, he takes an approach that was not implemented or taken by the Trial 
Court. As stated above from the Stonehocker v. Stonehocker and Mortensen v. Mortensen 
cases, "any significant disparity in the division of the remaining property should be based on 
an equitable rationale, other than on the sole fact that one spouse is awarded his or her gifts 
of inheritance." Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 2008), quoting Mortensen, 
760 P.2d at 308. 
The Court found that the commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, had a net 
value of $20,300.00. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1> 2009, pg. 8; TT 
at pg. 1065 11. 7-24.) Mrs. Boyer was not awarded any portion of the commercial building, 
which was valued at the $20,300.00. Id. The Trial Court fails to find and address the 
"equitable rationale" for not awarding Mrs. Boyer any interest or portion of the building on 
25th Street. 
In the Appellee's brief, Mr. Boyer makes several arguments and analyses that the 
portion of the $20,300.00 from the building on 25th Street, should not be in any way, shape or 
fashion awarded to Mrs. Boyer because the Trial Court has already factored that distribution 
in regards to debt division. (Appellee's brief, page 14) The Appellee then also makes figures 
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and calculations in an attempt to show and "prove" to this Appellate Court that the Trial 
Court was correct in its division, and that no overturn is necessary. (Appellee's brief, page 
14) Further, the Appellee even states in his brief: 
"Mr. Boyer's portion of the equity in his business, including the commercial 
building, is likely less than even the $20,300.00. However, the Trial Court 
considered only the value of the business, including the building at the time of 
the Trial. In an exact and equal division of property, Mrs. Boyer would 
receive $10,150.00 as her portion of equity in the business." 
(Appellee's brief, page 14) 
Further on in his brief, the Appellee then states "In an actual dollar for dollar offset, 
there is an additional $29,350.00 of marital debt which Mr. Boyer must pay, after the offset. 
This division allows the parties to go forward with their separate lives, as there is no longer 
any equity or debt entanglement." (Appellee's brief, page 15) The Trial Court however, 
never took the approach of doing a dollar for dollar division as Mr. Boyer has attempted to 
do in his brief. Further, the Trial Court fails to include in its Findings of Fact, to provide the 
"equitable rationale" that is required, for a significant disparity in the division of the 
commercial building on 25th Street. 
Paragraph 13 of the Amended Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law states as 
follows: 
Property: The Court finds that the Respondent acquired a partnership interest 
in a commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, where he conducts his 
business. The Court finds that there was evidence presented at trial that his 
business volume included the building equity of $32,000.00 that he valued his 
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business at $349,400.00. The Court finds that there were business liabilities of 
$329,100.00 leaving a net value of $20,300.00. The Court orders that all of 
the property from his business including the building, which the Court finds to 
be $20,300.00, be awarded to Respondent. (Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, page 8, said copy of 
Findings of Fact has been attached to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit C.) 
In the above paragraph regarding property, the Court awarded all of the $20,300.00 of 
the net value of the business to Mr. Boyer, none to Mrs. Boyer. In this finding, the Court 
again fails to establish the "equitable rationale" for the disparity and the division of this 
property. 
Laced throughout Mr. Boyer's brief, he develops the argument that the reasoning for 
the Trial Court to not award any portion of the $20,3000.00 of the value of the business to 
Mr. Boyer, was because of the substantial debt that Mr. Boyer took upon himself. 
(Appellee's brief, pages 14-15) 
The partial interest that Mr. Boyer had in the commercial building at 204 25th Street, 
where he conducts his business, which was valued at approximately $20,300.00, should be 
equitably divided and apportioned to Mrs. Boyer. The Trial Court provided no "equitable 
rationale" as to why said division should not occur in the amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
Issue 2: The Appellee is Incorrect on his Reasoning, as to Whether the District 
Court Abused its Discretion in Not Awarding Mrs, Boyer any share of Mr, Boyer's 
Retirement Accounts. 
In regards to the retirement accounts of Mr. Boyer and Mrs. Boyer, Mrs. Boyer stated 
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the following in her initial brief: 
At the time of the parties' divorce trial, Mr. Boyer was found to have a 
retirement account valued at approximately $12,500, where Mrs. Boyer was 
found to have a retirement account valued at approximately $2,500. (Amended 
Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 9) Without any 
detailed findings or analysis, the Court awarded each party their own separated 
retirement account. (Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 
2009, pg. 9) 
(Appellant's brief, page 20) 
Further, taken from the Appellee's brief, it is stated: 
In Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006), the Utah Court of Appeals 
specifically addressed the unequal division of retirement benefits. The Court 
explained "the primary purpose of a property division, in conjunction with an 
alimony award, 'is to achieve a fair, just and equitable result between the 
parties.'" Id. At f 27, quoting Haumont v. Haumont793 P. 2d 421 at 424 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). The Court further explained the "[although 'retirement 
accounts are part of the marital estate and they are generally to be equitably 
divided, an unequal division of marital property is justified when the trial court 
memorializes in commendably detailed findings the exceptional circumstance 
supporting the distribution." Id. At 27, quoting Davis v. Davis 76 P.3d 716 
(Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
(Appellee's brief, pages 15-16) 
In his brief, Mr. Boyer reasons that the Trial Court made the correct decision in not 
dividing the parties' retirement accounts, and that Mrs. Boyer received a favorable outcome 
in this decision because, according to Mr. Boyer, Mr. Boyer took on more credit card debt. 
(Appellee's brief, page 16) Further, Mr. Boyer then continues in his brief and quotes from a 
December 3, 2009 ruling from the Court, where the Court addresses the non-division of the 
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retirement accounts. (Appellee's brief, pages 16-17) The problem that Mr. Boyer faces 
here, is that after the ruling from December 3, 2009, the Court entered Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, which was signed by the Court 
on March 25, 2010. (Said copy of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc 
to June 1, 2009 has been attached to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit C.) According to the 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, the 
paragraph and section involving the retirement accounts states as follows: 
The Court awards each party his or her retirement accounts. Respondent's 
retirement account is valued at approximately $12,500.00. Petitioner's 
retirement account is valued at approximately $2,500.00. The Court adopts the 
rest of the parties' agreement with respect to personal property. 
(Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1, 
2009, page 9, attached to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit C.) 
Here, with the Amended Findings of Fact, the Court fails to provide any justification 
with detailed findings regarding the unequal division of the retirement accounts. Here, the 
Trial Court did abuse its discretion, whereupon the retirement accounts should have been 
equitably divided between Mr. Boyer and Mrs. Boyer. Unfortunately for Mr. Boyer, the Trial 
Court did not enter detailed findings regarding this inequitable division in its Amended 
Findings of Fact. As such, Mrs. Boyer should be awarded an equitable distribution or proper 
offset to Mr. Boyer's retirement. 
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Issue 3: The Appellee is Incorrect in His Reasoning on Whether the Trial Court 
Abused its Discretion in Ordering that the Alimony Awarded to Mrs. Boyer Be 
Structured to be Reduced Oyer a Certain Period of Time. 
As indicated in the Appellant's brief as well as the Appellee's brief, both recognize 
the Utah Supreme Court has held that, "generally, it is true that, because of uncertainty of 
future events, prospective changes to alimony are disfavored." Richardson v. Richardson, 
201 P.3d 942 a t ! 10 (Utah 2008). 
Mr. Boyer then further states in his brief the following: 
Ms. Boyer's improved financial future is fairly certain. The trial court found 
that she could work full time and earn the same wage or a higher wage in the 
future. The Utah Supreme Court found that when "the future event is certain 
to occur within a known time frame, then prospective changes are 
appropriate." Id. Atf 10. 
(Appellee's brief, page 19) 
Mrs. Boyer asserts that working full time is not the equivalent of having a fairly 
certain financial future. Mrs. Boyer further asserts that there is not anything about her 
financial future which is certain. In regards to Mrs. Boyer, the Trial Court made no specific 
findings that a future event is certain to occur within a specific known timeframe, 
specifically, there was no findings from the Trial Court that corresponded or correlated with 
the tier reduction of alimony in Mrs. Boyer's case. 
In regards to the alimony Finding of Fact, it was stated as follows: 
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To equalize the parties' standard of living , the Court orders the Respondent to 
pay the Petitioner $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5) 
years, commencing on July 1, 2008. Thereafter, the alimony is reduced to 
$1,000.00 per month on July 1, 2013, for another five (5) years and then the 
alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until December 31, 2015, at which 
time the alimony shall terminate. In any event, the alimony will terminate at 
the remarriage or death of the Petitioner. 
(Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1, 
2009, pages 7-8, attached to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit C.) 
The Trial Court fails to address in its findings, its reasoning as to using the tiered 
structure of alimony with periodic reductions. The prospectively reduced alimony after 
certain time periods, as awarded by the Trial Court, should not have been issued as such. The 
Trial Court failed to provide adequate findings and reasonings for this reduction. 
Issue 4: The Appellee is Incorrect in His Reasoning on the Issue of Whether the 
District Court Made a Clear Error in the Award of Alimony or the Termination Date of 
Alimony. 
Mr. Boyer was incorrect in his reasoning in his brief when he claimed that Mrs. Boyer 
did not adequately marshal the evidence in support of her appeal issue of the Trial Court 
having discrepancy date on when alimony should terminate. The following is a list of 
evidence that was marshaled to support Mrs. Boyer's issue: 
1. The Court ordered Mr. Boyer to pay Mrs. Boyer $1,428.00 in alimony each month 
for a period of five (5) years, commencing July 1, 2008. (Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc 
Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) (As contained in Appellant's brief, page 23) 
2. The Court further ordered that alimony is reduced to $ 1,000.00 per month on July 1, 
11 
2013, for another five (5) years (contained in Appellant's brief, page 23) and then the 
alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until December 31,2015, at which time the alimony 
shall terminate. (Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) (As 
contained in Appellant's brief, page 23) 
3. The Court awarded Mrs. Boyer alimony in the amount of $1,428 per month for a 
period of five years, commencing on July 1, 2008. (As contained in Appellant's brief, page 
4. The Court then awarded alimony for another five years, to commence on July 1, 
2013, at $1,000 per month. (As contained in Appellant's brief, page 24) 
5. The Court then reduced the alimony award even further to $800 per month to take 
place after the alimony award of $1,000 has run its course, but the Court also terminates the 
$800 alimony award December 31, 2015. (As contained in Appellant's brief, page 24) 
Mr. Boyer in his appeal states the following: 
Ms. Boyer alleges that the trial court erred in terminating alimony on 
December 31, 2015 because the trial court also provided for alimony for two 
periods of five years. When the trial court issued its oral ruling regarding 
alimony, counsel for Mr. Boyer recognized this possible discrepancy and 
specifically asked when alimony in the amount of $800.00 terminates. The 
court clearly stated that alimony terminates on December 31, 2015. (R. 616) 
Following written objections by Ms. Boyer and an additional hearing, in its 
written ruling of December 3, 2009, the trial court again stated that alimony 
terminates on December 31, 2015. 
Therefore, the record is clear that the trial court state that alimony would end 
on December 31, 2015. What is not clear is the amount of the alimony award 
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between July 1, 2013 and December 31, 2015. It is possible that the trial court 
meant for the alimony to last for ten years and six months and that the court 
made the error in it calculation of December 31, 2015. 
However, even if the court made an error in calculating when alimony reduces 
or ends, such an error is not against the clear weight of evidence and therefore 
not clearly erroneous. 
(As contained in Appellee's brief, page 24) 
Mrs. Boyer respectfully disagrees with Mr. Boyer, and argues that the Trial Courts' 
error in determining when alimony ends is a clear error. Mrs. Boyer had stated the following: 
It was the Court's intention that Mrs. Boyer receive alimony at $l,000.00for 
five years beginning July 1, 2013, hence the five year time period at the $ 1,000 
rate would cease July 1, 2018. It is clear that the Court intended Mrs. Boyer to 
receive alimony for ten (10) years at different amounts, and then for her to 
receive alimony for another time period at $800.00 a month. The error here is 
that alimony cannot terminate on December 31,2015, and also continue to July 
2018, and continue even further past that date with a different amount. 
(As contained in Appellant's brief, page 25) 
The alimony provision contained in the Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc 
to June 1, 2009 states as follows: 
To equalize the parties' standard of living , the Court orders the Respondent to 
pay the Petitioner $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5) 
years, commencing on July 1, 2008. Thereafter, the alimony is reduced to 
$1,000.00 per month on July 1, 2013, for another five (5) years and then the 
alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until December 31, 2015, at which 
time the alimony shall terminate. In any event, the alimony will terminate at 
the remarriage or death of the Petitioner. 
(Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1,2009, page 8, attached 
to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit B.) 
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The award of alimony given by the Trial Court is contrary to the Court's intent. A 
clear error was made by the Trial Court, where the Court awarded alimony for two (2) 
different time periods of five (5) years each, with alimony to also continue even after the two 
(2) sets of five (5) year time frames. 
Issue 5: The Appellee is Incorrect in His Reasoning as to Whether the District 
Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Not Addressing the Issue of Fault in Setting the 
Alimony Award. 
Under this section in Mr. Boyer's brief, he argues that the Trial Court is under no 
obligation to consider fault in regards to the alimony awards. (See Appellee's brief, page 23) 
Further, Mr. Boyer continues in his brief under this issue, and states that the Trial Court on 
this matter did in fact consider fault in regards to this alimony award by referencing the 
following statement: "The Court considered fault in awarding alimony. In the Court's 
opinion, this was not a long-term marriage, warranting permanent alimony." (See Appellee's 
brief, page 24) 
However, despite what was included in the Court's ruling, the actual Decree of 
Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law did not contain any language in 
regards to a finding of fault. The Findings of Fact in this case were in fact amended, as well 
as the Decree of Divorce, and fault is not included. The Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc 
pro Tunc to June 1, 2009 and the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc 
pro Tunc to June 1, 2009 are identical in regards to the provisions regarding alimony. They 
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state the following in regards to alimony: 
To equalize the parties' standard of living , the Court orders the Respondent to 
pay the Petitioner $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5) 
years, commencing on July 1, 2008. Thereafter, the alimony is reduced to 
$1,000.00 per month on July 1, 2013, for another five (5) years and then the 
alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until December 31, 2015, at which 
time the alimony shall terminate. In any event, the alimony will terminate at 
the remarriage or death of the Petitioner. 
(Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, page 8-9, 
attached to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit B and Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Nun Pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, page 8-9, attached to 
Appellant's Brief as Exhibit C.) 
It is clear from the Amended Decree of Divorce and Amended Findings in this case 
that fault was not considered in the alimony determination award. As indicated in 
Petitioner's initial brief, taken from the Riley v. Riley case, the Court stated the following: 
Husband's engagement in extramarital affairs and his prolonged deceitful 
conduct that led to the divorce, present precisely the type of situation where the 
legislature intended the trial court to consider fault. Id. At 88. 
(As contained in Appellant's brief, page 27) 
It is apparent that according to case law, that the Trial Court should, at a minimum, at 
least consider fault in the type of situation that Mr. Boyer and Mrs. Boyer were involved in, 
where there were extramarital affairs. 
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Issue 6: The Appellee is Incorrect in His Reasoning of Whether the Court Did 
Not Abuse its Discretion in its Alimony Award by Not Considering Mrs. Boyer's Health 
Conditions as a Result of Obtaining a Social/Venereal Disease from Mr. Boyer and 
Therefore Awarding Permanent Alimony to Her. 
In the Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, and the Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, the Trial Court 
failed to address the fault of Mr. Boyer in regards to Mrs. Boyer contracting a social/veneral 
disease from Mr. Boyer's unfaithfulness. 
In his brief, Mr. Boyer muddies the issues, where he calls into question the legitimacy 
of Mrs. Boyer's health problems, as well as other men that she had sexual relations with. 
(Appellee's brief, page 25) 
As already contained in Mrs. Boyer's initial brief, several factors and much evidence 
had been marshaled in support that the Trial Court abused its discretion in not considering 
Mrs. Boyer's health conditions as a result of obtaining a social/venereal disease through Mr. 
Boyer. 
1. Mr. Boyer was unfaithful during the marriage by committing adultery. (See 
Appellant's brief, page 27) 
2. During the marriage, Mrs. Boyer contracted a sexually transmitted disease from 
Mr. Boyer. (See Appellant's brief, page 28) 
3. Mrs. Boyer, as a result of her sexually transmitted disease, had to have surgery. 
(See Appellant's brief, page 28) 
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Despite the information that is provided above to support the Trial Court considering 
Mrs. Boyer's health conditions, the Court failed to mention it in its Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, and also did not address it in 
its Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009. Contrary to what is 
contained in Mr. Boyer's brief, Mrs. Boyer is not seeking to punish Mr. Boyer. (See 
Appellee's brief, page 26) Rather, Mrs. Boyer argues that the Trial Court simply abused its 
discretion in its alimony award by not considering Mrs. Boyer's health conditions as 
indicated throughout this issue. The Trial Court never made any specific findings or 
references regarding Mr. Boyer's fault, specifically in him committing adultery. The fault 
aspect should have been factored into the alimony analysis and calculation, but was not. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Boyer seeks an equitable interest or offset of the partial interest that Mr. Boyer 
has on the 25th Street building. (204 25th Street, Ogden, Utah). The Court failed to provide an 
"equitable rationale" in its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended 
Decree of Divorce. 
Mrs. Boyer seeks a "Woodward" share of Mr. Boyer's reti^cm^^. The Court failed to 
<\(\v" '' 
provide any justification in its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Amended Decree of Divorce. 
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Mrs. Boyer seeks that alimony structure not reduce over time, but rather stay at the 
higher amount, and also have a clarification of when alimony terminates. The Trial Court 
failed to provide any reasoning in the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Amended Decree of Divorce. 
Mrs. Boyer seeks a permanent alimony award, however, at a minimum, she seeks to 
have the Court determine how long her alimony award is for, and should not be shorter than 
the length of the marriage. The intent of the Trial Court was clear, in that alimony was to be 
awarded at a minimum often (10) years, two (2) five (5) year amounts, and then to continue 
beyond that at a different amount. 
Mrs. Boyer seeks the Court to include "fault" in its alimony determination. The Court 
provided no reasoning in its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or Amended 
Decree of Divorce regarding fault of Mr. Boyer, where case law is clear that this was a case 
where a Court should consider fault. 
DATED this _ 2 3 _ day of December, 2010. 
KRISTOPHER K. GREENWOOD, LC 
Rand G. Lunceford 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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